

COMMUNAL POLITICS IN THE IMPERIAL CAPITAL OF DELHI (1922-1927)

Biresh Chaudhuri¹

ABSTRACT

The transfer of Imperial British capital from Calcutta to Delhi was a significant move on part of the colonial administration taking into consideration the political developments that followed subsequently. Following the transfer, once the bureaucratic and legislative machinery was moved to Delhi, what followed was an influx of political pressure groups that had hitherto been active in other parts of India. The events surrounding the Partition of Bengal (1906) had made the British government unpopular in Bengal. There was an upsurge in revolutionary activities during the Swadeshi Movement agitation. Apart from the tense political situation, it was also felt that Calcutta was geographically ill adapted to be the capital of India. Delhi seemed to be the first choice, on geographical and historical grounds. This transfer apart from the financial and engineering requirements, had many social and political implications. It was indeed a matter of great pride for the people of Delhi as they now felt that the city had gained its lost place in Indian history, the premier position as the imperial capital of Hindustan, a position it had enjoyed during Sultanate and Mughal periods. Delhi henceforth turned into the nucleus of political activity and was to play an important role in the subsequent nationalist movement. The city witnessed unprecedented political activity in the wake of revolutionary activities like Delhi Conspiracy case, Ghadar movement and mass movements like Rowlatt Satyagraha and the Khilafat-Non-Cooperation Movement where popular participation transgressed all barriers of caste, race, region, religion etc. But the period post Non-Cooperation witnessed the growing tide of communalism in the country. In any case the communal situation had been deteriorating since the beginning of 1920's and whatever surface unity had been witnessed between Hindus and Muslims in the preceding decade had worn very thin. This article attempts to analyse the relations between the Hindus and Muslims in Delhi from 1922-1927 in the backdrop of communal antagonism prevailing throughout the country. Primary sources from the National Archives of India, both government as well as private records and secondary sources like Newspaper reports and books have been used in writing this paper.

KEYWORDS- Tabligh, Tanzim, Shuddhi, Sangathan, Deoband, Muslim League, AryaSamaj, Hindu Mahasabha, Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind

¹ Assistant Professor, Satyawati College, University Of Delhi

BACKGROUND

The Indian National Congress and the Muslim League joined hands together against a common foe, the British regime for the first time during the Khilafat and Non-Cooperation movements. While the former was based on a concept of Pan-Islamism, aiming to restore the pride of the Caliph or the spiritual leader of Islam, the latter was a movement initiated by Gandhi ji to bring the Hindus and Muslims on a common platform. Both these mass movements fostered communal harmony among the Hindus and the Muslims, which was considered to be one of the major characteristics of Indian politics during the period between 1919-1922. But the abrupt withdrawal of non-cooperation by Gandhi on account of the unfortunate ChauriChaura incident adversely affected the harmony between both the communities and caused a lot of dismay in the political circles. While many people felt betrayed, others, especially certain Muslim leaders, felt that they should have been consulted before calling it off and they even decided to defy Gandhi's call. So the move was unwelcomed by many.ⁱ Following the withdrawal of the Non Cooperation, Congress did not launch any mass movement at least for the time being. The League and Congress alliance was endangered by the decline of the Khilafat movement. The Muslim League became divided among the supporters of joint electorate and separate electorate. The Congress itself became divided among the no-changers and pro-changers, during the Gaya session in December 1922, the former sticking to Gandhian ways while the latter preferring to revert to constitutional politics.ⁱⁱ Due to this, the national consensus that had developed prior to the launching of Non Cooperation and Khilafat, gradually waned away. On being criticized for his abrupt withdrawal of the movement, Gandhi justified his action on the grounds that the very prospect of leading an essentially violent struggle following the ChauriChaura incident prompted him to take this step.ⁱⁱⁱ Gradually this also led to the waning away of the Hindu support for the Khilafat cause and the relations between both the communities got strained further. The Khilafat leadership was also divided on the future course of action. A fanatic Muslim leader Abdul Bari called for the use of violent means in the Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Hind Conference in Ajmer, held on March 22. However with the efforts of Gandhi, the matter cooled down.^{iv} The Viceroy Lord Reading considered Mohammed Ali to be the only link between the Hindus and Muslims and felt that in case of disenchantment between Gandhi and Mohammed Ali, the bridge over the gulf of Hindus and Muslims would collapse. And this factor indeed, the

growing differences of opinion between their leaders aggravated the distrust between both the communities. In April 1921, when India faced the prospect of an Afghan invasion, Mohammed Ali triggered a controversy by saying that in such a case, the Muslims of India would render help to the Afghans.^v Although a few days later, he tried to make amends in the Allahabad District Conference, the damage had already been done.^{vi} An Urdu poet, BrijNarain expressed his apprehension that Mohammed Ali was out to establish the hegemony of Islam in India, and considered it imperative for the Hindus to raise their heads and thwart any such attempt. In August 1921, the Moplahs in Malabar revolted against their Hindu landlords, desecrated temples and forcibly converted many Hindus to Islam. This was considered to be the last nail in the coffin for the already jeopardized Khilafat cause, weakening whatever little enthusiasm that was left. The situation had gone too far out of control and there seemed to be no turning back.

END OF THE ENTANTE

In this context, one could witness the growing tide of communalism in the country. Communalism has been defined as ‘the affirmation of the religious community as a political group.’^{vii} Not that communalism emerged after the withdrawal of non cooperation. Prior to that, the Muslim organizations had launched Tabligh and Tanzim movements, which aimed to strengthen the Muslims against forcible conversions to Hinduism and were considered to be a proselytizing endeavour on part of the Muslims.^{viii} In response, various Hindu organizations like AryaSamaj and Hindu Mahasabha started numerous campaigns for reclaiming the Hindus forcibly converted to Islam, known as Shuddhi and Sangthan movements. Swami Shraddhanad was one of the chief pioneers behind these movements, particularly in western UP, where he launched a campaign to reconvert the Gujars and Baniyas who had been converted to Islam.^{ix} All these inflamed the situation to such an extent that soon riots broke out in many parts of the country and the Indian National Congress could not arrest this communal divide.

The Hindu-Muslim unity in Delhi too was affected in the wake of these riots. But it was not the case of every Muslim leader fanning communal passions. Various Nationalist Muslim leaders like Dr Ansari, Ajmal Khan, Maulana Azad, Asaf Ali etc who stressed with vigour the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity. Although they had certain differences of opinion with the Congress leader, yet they remained staunch Congress supporters, for

which they were bitterly criticized by the Ali Brothers, who accused them of betraying their community. Even the Hindu militant religious outfits like the Hindu Mahasabha eyed these Muslim Nationalist leaders with suspicion. It was reported in November that ‘the ill-feeling between Hindus and Muslims is more evident than before.’^x A committee was formed on 23rd April 1923 which comprised of both local Hindu and Muslim leaders, to look into the matter and find a remedy to the problem of communal distrust prevalent, but sadly it achieved nothing in this regard.^{xi} Communal bitterness prevailed everywhere and overshadowed any type of political activity whatsoever. In the month of February, a prominent Home Rule League leader Annie Besant’s National Conference held a meeting in Delhi which was presided over by TezBahadurSapru, who emphasized the need for a fresh beginning of Hindu-Muslim entente and he rued the fact that the old traditional bitter rivalries had resurfaced following the non cooperation movement.^{xii} The local vernacular press too had a role to play in the unrest as it printed exaggerated reports on even trivial issues. During the month of April, Hindus and Muslims held meetings to discuss the issues related to reconversions. The stand taken by the Muslims in general was that since Delhi had a large number of bigoted Aryan protagonists, hence the Muslims too should show the same effort in order to contract the damaging effects of their teaching.^{xiii} During the first half of June 1923, a strong undercurrent of ill feelings between both the communities manifested in small riot like incidents occurring on almost daily basis. Various peace committees were formed every now and then to check any fractious activities, but none of them could leave any lasting impression.^{xiv} The people of Delhi were apprehensive of communal violence during the occasion of Bakr Eid during the last week of July. The leading citizens of Delhi requested the authorities to control the law and order situation. Though the three sacrificial days of Bakr Eid passed peacefully, on August 14, a riot was nearly averted in Katra Neel area of Old Delhi, a predominantly Hindu area that had a temple and two mosques.^{xv} Both the communities had been carrying on peaceful worship in the area for the past few years and the communal friction was largely considered to be the consequence of the garbled version of incidents produced by the local press.^{xvi} Such communal issues relegated every other issue to the background.^{xvii} So it can be seen that no longer were the two communities willing to fight side by side for the cause of the nation, a feeling of mutual distrust prevailed. In order to amicably resolve the Hindu-Muslim dispute, a special session of Congress was launched in Delhi on September 11th and 12th. Swami Shraddhanand agreed to

withdraw the Shuddhi movement if the Muslims too abandoned their counter movement. Various discussions were held by the leaders to suggest a solution for resolving differences. In these discussions, the Hindus were led by Madan Mohan Malviya and Muslims were led by MaulviShabirHussain of Deoband.^{xviii} The Muslims on their part made it clear that they were not totally hostile to the Hindu movements as such, but the circumstances in which they originated ran the risk of jeopardizing the nationalist cause. The Hindus were urged to call off the Shuddhi campaign because it had created a lot of misunderstanding among the Muslims.^{xix} Simultaneously, Swami Shraddhanand and Malviya tried to abate the apprehensions of Muslims by emphasizing the fact that that movements like Shuddhi and Sanghatan were carried out with the sole aim of safeguarding the interests of Hindus, and did not intend to hurt the religious sentiments of other religion.^{xx} Swami Shraddhanand made it clear that if there were no attacks against the Hindus, the Shuddhi and Sangathan Movements would automatically cease to exist. It was felt that an amicable settlement was the need of the hour, as soon as possible and it also needed to be ensured that everyone gets the freedom to practice their religion without hurting the sentiments of each other and only then can an atmosphere of goodwill prevailed. A committee was formed to consider the suggestions that were made during the above mentioned discussions and was asked to submit its report to the All India Congress Committee within two months.^{xxi} Another committee comprising of two Muslim members- Maulvi Muhammad Shafi and MaulviZulfiqar Khan and two Hindu members- PanditNeki Ram and PanditSitaram was constituted to probe into the incidents that were connected to the Shuddhi and anti-Shuddhi Movements and asked to submit its report within a month.^{xxii} The people of Delhi did not show any interest in the proceedings of the Congress Session on 15th September. The results of this session were purely negative in the sense that they failed to relieve the tensions between the two communities and their relations remained as strained as ever. Some attempts were definitely made to soothe the strained relations but they failed to create any lasting impact. On September 20th, a public meeting was held in Delhi which was chaired by Swami Sharaddhanad. He said that the Hindu Sangathans or Organizations from now on would include civic guards and their membership would be open to all communities.^{xxiii} This view was endorsed by Ajmal Khan who declared that both the communities, instead of quarrelling with each other should instead focus on a common enemy, the British.

VIOLENCE AGAIN RAISES ITS HEAD

The months of October, November and December 1923 witnessed somewhat calm and peaceful situation. The relations remained strained but there was no apprehension of any disturbance. Peace and tranquility prevailed in Delhi for the first half of 1924 as well. The Id-ul-Fitr passed off peacefully in May. No unpleasant incident occurred till July, when the city witnessed riots for about a week, on the occasion of Bakr Eid when sacrificial cows were being led to a slaughter house near Idgah,^{xxiv} via Sadar Bazaar area. Hindus and Jains living in that area had earlier protested against building this slaughter house as it was close to the Jhandewalan temple. This time around riots broke out between the Muslims of PahariDhiraj area and Jats of Sadar Bazaar on 11th July and continued till the 19th of that month.^{xxv} What followed was an immense loss of lives and property, and both communities blamed each other for creating troublesome situation. Both the influential Muslim leaders as well as Congress leaders like Mohammed Ali, Shaukat Ali, ShankarLal etc all but watched the carnage, and were unable to control the situation. Mohammed Ali repeatedly requested Gandhi and the top leadership of Congress to control the situation but it seemed that they too were helpless in this regard.^{xxvi} Had Gandhi tried to resolve the situation, it may or may not have yielded the desired results but it could have revitalized the dampened spirits of his Muslim followers and would have encouraged them to carry on their campaign against the communal forces. Finally, it was with the help of local authorities that the situation was brought under control. Gandhi suggested the setting up of an enquiry committee to probe into the matter but most of the members of the Congress Committee considered it futile. On 19th July an article was published in the statesman newspaper that there was an influx of Pathans in the city and it could aggravate the tension.^{xxvii} To allay the fears, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi, E.R. Abott stated that Delhi already has a sizeable permanent population of Pathans and rubbished the report of any such influx. The authorities also appealed to the newspapers to refrain from publishing such communal articles in an irresponsible manner, citing the reason that it kept alive the communal tension in wake of the recent disturbances, embittered by the tone of articles appearing in the newspapers. The editors were urged to take every possible step to allay the communal distrust.^{xxviii}

A Unity Conference was convened in Delhi from 26th September to 2nd October presided by Motilal Nehru. During this conference, in order to deal with communal

violence various measures like bill of religious rights guaranteeing freedom of religion, expression, mutual tolerance for each other's customs etc were approved of.^{xxix} According to AbulKalam Azad, the Conference was successful in resolving satisfactorily, most of the problems. The *HindustanTimes* too expressed its satisfaction over the agreement on all the important points of dispute.^{xxx} It was felt that the Unity Conference would result in the dawn of a new era of permanent peace and unity in the country, and everyone would take a vow to continue with their efforts to promote peace and unity.^{xxxi} In fact the Chief Commissioner of Delhi too seemed hopeful. In a message, he solicited his support for the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity terming it as a must for progress of India. After the Unity Conference, the communal tension in Delhi cooled down, albeit temporarily because communal violence again raised its head very soon.

On 23rd January 1925, an All-Party Conference was held in Delhi where the prominent leaders like Gandhi, Motilal Nehru, Annie Besant, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Ali brothers, Maulana Azad, etc participated.^{xxxii} This conference had clear cut aims to ensure communal and political unity because it was felt that as long as both the communities set aside their mutual differences, achieving political unity was next to impossible.^{xxxiii} Gandhi also wanted to formulate a scheme for Swaraj and suggested that a sub-committee be established to chalk out a plan of agreement between both the communities.^{xxxiv} This idea of Gandhi was endorsed by leaders like Mohammad Ali Jinnah and PanditMadan Mohan Malviya who too felt the need to establish a united and representative committee to secure Hindu-Muslim unity. On 24th January, a sub-committee was established comprising of 40 members. It had two fold aims- one to deal with Hindu-Muslim unity and the other to deal with the scheme of Swaraj.^{xxxv}

But as it turned out no fruitful conclusion could be reached because the atmosphere of suspicion prevailed everywhere and no one was willing to trust people from other communities and Gandhi too felt that under the prevailing circumstances, it would have been impossible to frame any united scheme. On 13th April, a meeting was organized by the local Congress Committee to commemorate the JallianwalaBagh incident. The Ali Brothers were the lead speakers who again advised the Hindus and Muslims to unite, but unfortunately, there were no takers.^{xxxvi} And the hitherto peaceful atmosphere that had been prevailing for the past few months did not last long as the month of June 1925 again witnessed some disturbance as the Idgah slaughter house once again became the centre of communal discord. This time around, the bone of contention was

the PahariDhiraj route which had been built earlier as an alternative to the Sadar Bazaar route. The Muslim members of the Municipal Committee made every possible effort to resolve the crisis by appealing to their fellow Muslims to change the route, and urging the Government to build a new slaughter house in Bara Hindu Rao region, but the plea fell on deaf ears and even the local authorities showed reluctance to oblige.^{xxxvii} Maybe they did not want to get involved in this tense political situation. The Unity Conference or the All-Party Conference for that matter, therefore had clearly failed in its endeavour.

The year 1926, too witnessed communal tension and also brisk political activities. The Ninth Session of All India Hindu Mahasabha was held in Delhi in March 1926, whereby the leaders emphasized the need for Hindu community to become organized which in turn would lead to the Muslims extending a hand of friendship towards them.^{xxxviii} The President of the Mahasabha, Raja Narendranath in his speech made it clear that the Hindus and Muslims had the same political and civic interests and that since the interests of Muslims are being treated as a separate category by itself then so should the Hindu interests. The second half of 1926 witnessed some incidents of rioting in the city. Despite strict government orders against spreading rumours which could cause disturbances and break the peace, a serious riot occurred in the KhariBaoli region on 24th June, when a rumour spread that a sacrificial cow was to be taken through the area. The local authorities assured the people that it was a rumour and the crowd started to disperse but a pony driven cart passed through the area which led to confusion and the riot which followed left 3 dead and 69 injured.^{xxxix} Another riot occurred in a local bank at ChandniChowk on 27 August, when a Hindu peon abused some members of a Muslim business firm.^{xl} What began as a verbal quarrel soon turned into blows. Thanks to the timely intervention of local authorities the situation was brought under control. Some other communal incidents too were controlled on occasions when they could have taken the shape of riot.

Events took a nasty turn when one Abdul Rashid assassinated Swami Shraddhanand on December 23, probably due to the Shuddhi campaigns initiated by the latter.^{xli} Quite obviously, it was bound to enrage the Hindu populace but the situation did not flare up as both Congress and Muslim league members denounced this act as cowardly and appealed for communal harmony.^{xlii} Both the communities were urged to live in a spirit of peace, harmony and brotherhood. On 31st January 1927, a meeting was organized at the Parade Ground, and was addressed by S. SrinivasaIyenger of the Indian National

Congress, who said that if the Muslims had the right to carry on the Tabligh and the Tanzim, then the Hindus too were entitled to carry on Shuddhi and Sangathan movements. There is no end to this politics of hatred, hence he issued a fervent appeal to both the communities to eschew violence and bring about communal harmony. On 23rd April, another riot took place in Rithala village, where the relations between both the communities had been strained for the past few days over the issue of cow slaughter. In this riot, 3 people were killed and a few others sustained injuries. The police however brought the situation under control.^{xliii} In the month of May a deputation of local Hindus urged the Chief Commissioner to prohibit the sacrificial cow procession to pass through the PahariDhiraj area, on occasion of Id. No assurances were given. On 4th June, Dr. Ansari in a press conference urged the Hindus and Muslims to meet at the residence of Ajmal Khan to devise ways to bury the evil of communalism forever and live in peace and harmony. The meeting was held on 8th June and was attended by 70 persons. It was decided to constitute a Board of Arbitration consisting of 13 members to arbitrate in all matters of Hindu and Muslim disputes and differences regarding the routes and passages of the sacrificial cattle during BakrId.^{xliv} The 13 member Board comprised of Hakim Ajmal Khan, Dr. Ansari. LalaKedarnath, Dr.Shroff, Deshbandhu Gupta, Kifayatullah, MaulviMazharuddin etc. This Arbitration Board also came to be known as Conciliation Board. To some extent it succeeded in improving the communal situation in Delhi. The Bakr Id festival passed off peacefully thereby reflecting the desire of both the Hindus and Muslims to maintain peace and communal harmony.^{xlv} The Delhi leaders were encouraged by the initial success of this Board and thought of applying this formula at the national level. In a public meeting held at Queens Garden on 20th June, Dr. Ansari thanked the people for peacefully observing the Bakr Id and he informed the people of the decision to set up a permanent representative body for immediate settlement of disputes that might arise in future. He spoke of an electoral board comprising of 65 Hindus and 63 Muslims and 29 people from other communities. The duty of this electoral board would be to elect persons to form a permanent board of arbitration to promote communal harmony and a civic spirit among the citizens of Delhi.^{xlvi} In response various Hindu and Muslim organizations sent the names of their representatives to Dr. Ansari who wanted the people to settle the communal question without narrowness and bigotry.

But it would not be wrong to say that all the efforts failed ultimately as on 23rd August, the communal situation again got worsened when a worker of the Hindu Mahasabha,

Nanak Chand was assassinated.^{xlvii} Fearing violence the local authorities imposed Section 144 on 24th August. The same day, AryaSamaj organized a meeting at Chawri Bazaar where the Hindus were urged to resort to guerrilla warfare in order to counter the enemy of the Hindu movement and prevent the annihilation of their community. Clearly, despite the attempts of various leaders to bring about communal harmony, people seldom paid any heed to these advices and even when a semblance of peace and tranquillity seemed to be prevailing, something always happened which tended to disrupt the communal harmony. It would not be a mistake to say that some militant radical groups were adamant not to allow any spirit of communal harmony to prevail and often resorted to manipulating the minds of the innocent people over trivial issues, breeding communal hatred. Such a phenomena is ever lasting, continues till today.

CONCLUSION

If we put in retrospect the events that transpired in Delhi from 1922-1927, we can find an increasing trend of communal violence. From 1924-27, 24 people lost their lives and 399 were injured.^{xlviii} It seems that there was no common bond between the two communities post Non Cooperation and collapse of Khilafat. The contemporary scenario was dominated by militant communal organizations that were more concerned with harbouring communal passions. Not that various leaders on both sides did not try to arrest the progress of communal violence. But for all their conferences, discussions etc, mutual distrust and fear prevailed. Some of the issues involving the routes leading to the slaughter houses breded inflammatory situations at times but the lack of seriousness on the part of the local authorities on most occasions, did not do any good to the cause of peace and harmony. A serious approach on part of the authorities might have led to a cordial settlement being reached, but sadly that was not to be. No one could foresee that such trifling issues could one day lead to the partition of the country. It seems whatever explanation one may give, it was quite clear that every political leader was trying to politicize the communal issues for the benefit of his or her own religious community. Mere appeals and assurances to people in the name of bringing about religious solidarity is not enough. Concrete steps needed to be taken to manage the situation which unfortunately did not plan out. The distrust and hatred had grown to that extent where things could never have been the same as before. On one hand, they had the colonial rule to fight against, and on the other, their religious interests clashed.

One thing seemed very clear that all these politics did no good to the cause of Hindu Muslim unity.

-
- ⁱMinault, *The Khilafat Movement*, p. 185.
- ⁱⁱBandyopadhyay, *From Plassey to Partition*, pp. 311-312
- ⁱⁱⁱGandhi to Nehru, 19 February 1922, *Nehru Papers* (NMML)
- ^{iv}*Amrit Bazaar Patrika*, 11 March 1922, p.14.
- ^vHasan, *Nationalism and Communal politics in India, 1916-1928*, p. 190.
- ^{vi}Home Political B, No. 10, April 1921 (NAI)
- ^{vii}Dhanedhar, *Struggle For Freedom*, p. 96.
- ^{viii}Home Political D, No.96, October 1924 (NAI)
- ^{ix}Pandey, *The Ascendency of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh*, p. 115.
- ^xHome Political D, No. 18, First Half of November 1922 (NAI)
- ^{xi}Home Political D, No. 25, 2nd Half of April 1925 (NAI)
- ^{xii}*The Indian Annual Register*, Delhi, Vol. 2, 1923, p. 84.
- ^{xiii}Home Political D, 1st Half of April 1923 (NAI)
- ^{xiv}*Ibid.*, 1st Half of July 1923 (NAI)
- ^{xv}Home Political D, No. 25, 1st Half of August 1923 (NAI)
- ^{xvi}*Ibid.*
- ^{xvii}*Ibid.*, 2nd Half of August 1923 (NAI)
- ^{xviii}*The Indian Annual Register*, Delhi, Vol. 2, 1923, p. 190
- ^{xix}*Ibid.*
- ^{xx}*Ibid.*, p. 191.
- ^{xxi}Dhanedhar, *Struggle for Freedom*, p. 103.
- ^{xxii}*Encyclopaedia of National Congress, 1921-1924*, Vol. 3, p. 615.
- ^{xxiii}Home Political D, No. 25, 1st Half of September 1923 (NAI)
- ^{xxiv}Home Political B, No. 249/ii B/July 1924 (NAI)
- ^{xxv}*Ibid.*
- ^{xxvi}Mohammed Ali to Gandhi, 21 July 1924, *Mohammed Ali Papers* (PA, JMI)
- ^{xxvii}Dhanedhar, *Struggle for Freedom*, p. 104.
- ^{xxviii}*Ibid.*
- ^{xxix}Resolution passed at the Unity Conference in Delhi, 26 September to 2 October 1924, F. No. 25/1924.
- ^{xxx}*Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 2 October 1924, p. 15
- ^{xxxi}Home Political B, No. 110, First Half of October 1924 (NAI)
- ^{xxxii}*The Indian Annual Register*, Delhi, Vol. 1, 1925, p. 65.
- ^{xxxiii}Home Political A, No. 112, First Half of 1925 (NAI)
- ^{xxxiv}*Ibid.*
- ^{xxxv}*The Indian Annual Register*, Delhi, Volume 1, 1925, p. 73.
- ^{xxxvi}Home Political B, No. 112, March 1925 (NAI)
- ^{xxxvii}Hasan, ed., *Muslims and the Congress*, p. 14.
- ^{xxxviii}*The Indian Annual Register*, Delhi, Volume 1, 1925, p. 398
- ^{xxxix}*Ibid.*
- ^{xl}*Ibid.*
- ^{xli}*Ibid.*
- ^{xlii}*Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 26 December 1926, p. 12.
- ^{xliii}Home Judicial, No. 75, April 1927 (NAI)
- ^{xliv}*Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 9 June 1927, p. 17.
- ^{xlv}*Ibid.*, 13 June 1927.
- ^{xlvi}*Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 13 June 1927, p. 7.
- ^{xlvii}*Ibid.*, 24 August 1927, p. 9.
- ^{xlviii}Page, *Prelude to Partition*, pp. 106-108.

REFERENCES

1. *Amrit Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, 11 March 1922, 14.
2. Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar. *From Plasey to Partition: A History of Modern India*, New Delhi, 2004.
3. Dhanedhar, Reva. *Struggle for Freedom: The Role of Delhi*, Dehradun, 2011.
4. *Encyclopaedia of Indian National Congress, 1921-24, Vol.3*, 615.
5. Gandhi to Nehru, 19 February 1922, *Nehru Papers, Nehru Memorial museum and Library (NMML)*.
6. Hasan, Mushirul. *Nationalism and Communal Politics in India, 1916-1928*, Delhi, 1979.
7. Hasan, Mushirul, ed., *Muslims and the Congress: Select Correspondence of Dr. M.A.Ansari*, Delhi, 1979.
8. *Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 2 October 1924, 15.
9. *Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 13 June 1927, 7.
10. *Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 25 December 1926, 12.
11. *Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 9 June 1927, 17.
12. Home Judicial, No. 75, April 1927, *National Archives of India (NAI)*.
13. Home Political No. 25, 1st Half of September 1923, *National Archives of India (NAI)*.
14. Home Political B, No. 10, April 1921, *Natioanal archives of India (NAI)*.
15. Home Political B, No. 110, First half of October 1924, *National Archives of India (NAI)*.
16. *Home Political B, No. 112, March 1925, National Archives of India (NAI)*.
17. Home Political B, No. 249/ii B/ July 1924, *National Archives of India (NAI)*.
18. Home Political D, No 18, First half of November 1922, *National Archives of India (NAI)*.
19. Home Political D, No. 25, 1st half of April 1923, *National Archives of India (NAI)*.
20. Home political D, No 25, 2nd half of April 1923, *National Archives of India (NAI)*.
21. Home Political D, No. 25, 1st half of August 1923, *Natioanal Archives of India (NAI)*.
22. Home Political D, No. 96, October 1924, *National Archives of India (NAI)*.

-
23. Home Political, No. 112, First half of 1925, *National Archives of India (NAI)*
 24. Minault, Gail. *The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilization in India*, New York, 1982.
 25. *Mohammed Ali to Gandhi, 21 July 1924, Mohammed Ali Papers, Premchand Archives, Jamia Millia Islamia (PA, JMI).*
 26. Page, David. *Prelude to Partition: The Indian Muslim and the Imperial System of Control*, Delhi, 1982.
 27. Pandey, Gyanendra. *The Ascendency of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh*, Delhi, 1978.
 28. *Resolution passed at the Unity Conference Delhi, 26 September to 2 October 1924, F. No. 25/1924, AICC papers (NMML).*
 29. *The Indian Annual Register*, Delhi, Vol. 2, 1923, 190.
 30. *The Indian Annual Register*, Delh
 31. *The Indian Annual Register*, Delhi, Vol. 1, 1925, 65
 32. *The Indian Annual Register*, Delhi, Vol. 1, 1923, 73.
 33. *The Indian Annual Register*, Delhi, Vol.1, 1925, 398